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China’s Sanctions and Rule of Law:
How to Respond When China Targets Lawyers
Thomas D. Grant * & F. Scott Kieff **
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has begun to use sanctions against people who speak
out against its policies. 1 Well-known are the sanctions that the PRC’s Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson announced on January 20, 2021 against twenty-eight persons, both named and
unnamed, who recently served or were then serving in the Trump administration, including the
then-Secretary of State and National Security Adviser. 2 On March 26, 2021, however, the PRC
announced sanctions against a less conspicuous target: Essex Court Chambers, a set of barristers’
chambers in London known for commercial work and investment arbitration. 3 What ostensibly
provoked China’s unusual move was a hundred-odd-page legal opinion. Four barristers in Essex
Court—Alison Macdonald QC, Jackie McArthur, Naomi Hart, and Lorraine Aboagye—had
* Thomas D. Grant is a Fellow of the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law at Cambridge
University. He is a former U.S. designee to the Permanent Court of Arbitration and served as
Senior Advisor for Strategic Planning in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International
Security and Nonproliferation and in the Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security, 2019–2021.
** F. Scott Kieff is a professor at George Washington University Law School. A
commissioner of the U.S. International Trade Commission from 2013–2017, he has served as an
adviser to high-level government officers during the Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations
on national security and economics.
1. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Announces Sanctions on Pompeo and Others, Ministry of
Foreign Affs. of China (Jan. 20, 2021),
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1847554.shtml
[https://perma.cc/3R8H-8YCC]
2. Id.
3. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Announces Sanctions on Relevant UK Individuals and
Entities, Ministry of Foreign Affs. of China (Mar. 26, 2021),
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1864366.shtml
[https://perma.cc/26UC-V73X]; see also Essex Court Chambers Statement on Sanctions Imposed
by Chinese Government, Essex Ct. Chambers (Mar. 26, 2021), https://essexcourt.com/essexcourt-chambers-statement-on-sanctions-imposed-by-chinese-government/
[https://perma.cc/F3QY-UDXF].

102

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

[VOL. 55, NO. 1

supplied the opinion to address whether China might have international criminal responsibility for
crimes against humanity and genocide against the Uyghurs. 4
If China adopted sanctions against a group of lawyers in private practice in a mere fit of
pique, then policy makers would have little reason to give the matter much thought. 5 One would
suppose that sanctions against high-profile public officials merit more concern. 6 And, even
sanctions such as those are perhaps not too much cause for worry. We know that PRC officials
sometimes adopt a hectoring tone out of rhetorical habit rather than strategic purpose. 7 Why
concern ourselves with China’s sanctions unless they have a direct effect on trade, commerce, or
other readily quantifiable equities?
But China’s recent use of sanctions should not be ignored. 8 Among China’s sanctions last
year, the sanctions against the Essex Court barristers are particularly troubling. 9 For reasons that
policy makers need to recognize, those sanctions were not mere rhetoric, 10 and salving a bruised
ego was not China’s goal in adopting them. China has a method and a purpose, and it connects to
a larger strategy that China pursues on the global stage. We need a clear view of how sanctions
against private citizens function: they produce immediate effects on the targets they name, but
their purpose is to produce lasting effects on the wider community to which the targets belong. 11
The community here particularly concerned is the legal profession—and it would be a mistake to
think China’s focus on that profession is by chance. There are sound reasons to conclude it is by
design. The time has come to start thinking about how countries for which the rule of law is not
only a core value but also an indispensable tool might respond.
A recent case in the European Union (EU) related to U.S. sanctions merits a closer look for
the lessons it offers in crafting a response to China’s sanctions strategy. 12 Bank Melli Iran v.
Telekom Deutschland, 13 which the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decided on
4. See generally Alison Macdonald, et al., International Criminal Responsibility for Crimes
Against Humanity and Genocide Against the Uyghur Population in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region, Essex Ct. Chambers, (Jan. 26, 2021), https://14ee1ae3-14ee-4012-91cfa6a3b7dc3d8b.usrfiles.com/ugd/14ee1a_3f31c56ca64a461592ffc2690c9bb737.pdf
5. Id. The barristers wrote the opinion on instruction by the Global Legal Action Network, the
World Uyghur Congress, and the Uyghur Human Rights Project, human rights groups concerned
with the conduct of the PRC government toward the Uyghurs.
6. Ministry of Foreign Affs. of China, supra note 3.
7. Ministry of Foreign Affs. of China, supra note 1.
8. See id.
9. See Ministry of Foreign Affs. Of China, supra note 1; see also Ministry of Foreign Affs. Of
China, supra note 3.
10. See Ministry of Foreign Affs. of China, supra note 3.
11. See id.
12. Case C-124/20, Bank Melli Iran v. Telekom Deutschland GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2021:386
(Dec. 21, 2021) [hereinafter Telekom (Judgment)].
13. Id. at ¶ 12.
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December 21, 2021, illuminates some pitfalls for lawyers advising commercial actors as they
manage compliance in a complex environment of conflicting U.S. and EU sanction regimes. 14 The
case should also interest policy makers because it illustrates how one sovereign has used a socalled “sanctions blocking” statute against sanctions that it wishes to counteract. 15 The sanctions
concerned in the Telekom Deutschland case are U.S. sanctions against Iran; they aim to impede
Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 16 The case should interest policy makers, not because it will change
anybody’s view for or against U.S. Iran sanctions, but because it offers lessons for policy makers
as they strategize a way to counteract the serious effects that China’s sanctions will have if left
unanswered.
I. The Method and Purpose Behind China’s Sanctions
Before strategizing a response to China’s sanctions, policy makers need to understand how
China intends its sanctions to function—and what China hopes they will achieve.
China, at first glance, in adopting the sanctions against Essex Court would appear to have a
narrow aim. The aim would appear to be to penalize a small and specific handful of critics who
have drawn attention to China’s egregious record of abuse toward the Uyghurs. 17 On inspection,
the effect of the sanctions even on the specific individuals they target would appear to be slight. 18
The four barristers who wrote the opinion about the Uyghurs and the other barristers belonging to
Essex Court will no longer be able to travel to China; any assets they might hold in China will be
frozen. 19 It is reported that these individuals, or most of them, in fact do not travel to China very
often and hold few if any assets there. 20
To understand how China intends the sanctions to function, one must widen the aperture
and recognize that the people immediately targeted by the Essex Court sanctions are only part of
the story. It was Voltaire in his novel Candide who described the death sentence of a British
14. As to the corporate compliance issues that Telekom Deutschland raises, see Thomas Grant
& Scott Kieff, Warnings And Guideposts From EU Sanctions Blocking Case, Law360 (June 4,
2021, 5:43 PM) https://www.law360.com/articles/1390362/warnings-and-guideposts-from-eusanctions-blocking-case [https://perma.cc/W4KC-R2F3] (addressing CJEU Advocate General
Hogan’s opinion of May 12, 2021 in that case, hereinafter Telekom (Advocate General’s
Opinion).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Ministry of Foreign Affs. of China, supra note 3.
18. Id.
19. Alison Macdonald, et al., supra note 4, at 105; Ministry of Foreign Affs. of China, supra note
3.
20. Primrose Riordan et al., UK Lawyers Feel Ripples of Chinese Sanctions on Essex Court
Chambers, Fin. Times (Apr. 4, 2021). https://www.ft.com/content/e6ab6819-6040-4b7f-b5793a51658f7a4b [https://perma.cc/G3P3-T4FV].
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admiral as an act “pour encourager les autres.” 21 The admiral in question had displeased the
Admiralty, but the real point in sentencing him was to make an example in front of the officer
corps as a whole. 22 A better understanding of the Essex Court sanctions is much like that: China
certainly was not pleased with the four barristers who wrote the opinion and called China to
account for its ill-treatment of the Uyghurs, 23 but it would be a mistake to think that that is where
the story ends. With the recent seemingly targeted sanctions, China aimed to provide a
demonstration to the legal profession as a whole. 24 And the demonstration has had visible effects. 25
A number of barristers affiliated with Essex Court in Singapore quit the chambers shortly
after China adopted the sanctions. 26 Toby Landau, a Queen’s Council known for his work in
international investment arbitration, quit the chambers “with effect from . . . 2 April 2021.” 27
Matthew Gearing QC, a former co-head of arbitration at a major law firm who had planned to
move his practice to Essex Court, decided against it. 28 Essex Court removed the legal opinion
from its website. 29
So, China’s method is to make a demonstration—but for what purpose? A reshuffling of
nameplates around the Inns of Court in London has resulted from the March 2021 sanctions. 30 But
this is only a surface reflection of a deeper effect that China evidently seeks to bring about. 31 We
should contemplate that, in fact, China seeks to spread a chill across the legal profession, a
subduing influence to stay or silence anybody in the profession who might otherwise advance
opinions that call China’s conduct into question or advise or represent parties whom China dislikes.

21 Voltaire, Candide ou L’Optimisme 174 (Librairie E. Droz 2d ed. 1931).
22. Id.
23. Ministry of Foreign Affs. of China, supra note 3.
24. Riordan et al., supra note 20.
25. See Jaime Hamilton, Essex Court Chambers Backpedals After China Imposes Sanctions,
Roll on Friday (Apr. 1, 2021) https://www.rollonfriday.com/news-content/essex-court-chambersbackpedals-after-china-imposes-sanctions [https://perma.cc/HTD4-KXXZ]; see also Toby
Landau QC Leaves Essex Court Chambers, Essex Ct. Chambers (Apr. 6, 2021)
https://essexcourt.com/toby-landau-qc-leaves-essex-court-chambers/ [https://perma.cc/2D6EA4JZ].
26. Jaime Hamilton, supra note 24.
27. Essex Ct. Chambers, supra note 24.
28. Gearing Changes Course after China sanctions, Global Arbitration Rev. (Apr. 26, 2021),
https://globalarbitrationreview.com/sanctions/gearing-changes-course-after-china-sanctions
[https://perma.cc/TRS4-4MLJ].
29. Neil Rose, Chambers hit by China sanctions battens down the hatches, Legal Futures (Mar.
30, 2021), https://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/chambers-hit-by-china-sanctions-battensdown-the-hatches [https://perma.cc/ET5S-V9K2].
30. Hamilton, supra note 24; Essex Court Chambers, supra note 24.
31. Hamilton, supra note 24; Essex Court Chambers, supra note 24.
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The legal profession functions under rules resembling those of a guild, but nobody today denies
that it is also a business. 32 And, as businesspeople, lawyers seek to keep and increase their
opportunities to do business. That means keeping the clients they have and entering new
engagements as new clients come along. 33 The converse is that lawyers are tempted to sidestep
those who might cost them business in the future. They seldom if ever do this openly; in many
rule-of-law jurisdictions, lawyers’ binding ethical duties constrain them from such
discrimination. 34 Omissions and reticence are hard to detect. However, for a sovereign of China’s
influence in the world economy, they are not hard to incentivize. With sanctions targeted in a
visible way on one group of lawyers, China has communicated a clear incentive to the legal
profession. 35 The intended result—the legal profession backing away from certain parties—is
pernicious. 36
II. The Global “Operating System” and China’s Revisionist Aims
And, yet, evidence suggests that the purpose for which China is using sanctions is more
ambitious than depriving certain parties and causes of the legal counsel they seek. 37
Christopher Ford, a diplomat and national security official in the G.W. Bush and Trump
administrations, has argued for a decade that China seeks not to gain mere tactical advantage, but
instead to change the “operating system” under which nations and societies function. 38 The 2018
US National Security Strategy stated the case like this: China’s goal is “to shape a world consistent
with [its] authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic,
32. Mark A. Cohen, Law Is a Profession and an Industry -- It Should Be Regulated That Way
Forbes (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/markcohen1/2018/03/29/law-is-aprofession-and-an-industry-it-should-be-regulated-that-way/?sh=45bee33b6598
[https://perma.cc/ME5V-LYMT].
33. Id.
34. The Bars Standard Bd. Handbook r. C28 (Bar Standards Bd. 2020).
35. Ministry of Foreign Affs. of China, supra note 3.
36. Id.
37. Christopher A. Ford, U.S.-Australia “Track II” dialogue held at the Australian Defense
College in Canberra (Apr. 18, 2013), in Christopher A. Ford, The Asia-Pacific Region’s
“Operating System” and The “Chinese Dream” of Global “Return” New Paradigms F. (Apr. 30,
2013), https://www.newparadigmsforum.com/p1667 [https://perma.cc/84HY-PT4Z]; See also A
‘China Model?’ Beijing’s Promotion of Alternative Global Norms and Standards: Hearing
Before the U.S.-China Econ. & Sec. Rev. Comm’n, 116th Cong. 35–69, 169–80 (2020)
(statements of Daniel Tobin, Member of the China Studies Faculty, National Intelligence
University, and Senior Associate (Non-resident), Freeman Chair in China Studies, Center for
Strategic and International Studies) [hereinafter Beijing's Promotion of Alternative Global
Norms].
38. Ford, supra note 37; Beijing’s Promotion of Alternative Global Norms, supra note 37.

106

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

[VOL. 55, NO. 1

and security decisions.” 39 To shape the world that way means to transform both how countries
relate to one another and how they order their own affairs. 40 China’s goal is not minor adjustments
here and there. 41 It is wholesale revision. 42
The conclusion that China aims to place itself at the apex of a new social system on a worldwide
scale is not based on guesswork. 43 China’s leaders have stated that is what China aims to do. Their
invocation of the “Strong Military Dream” and “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”
underpin the aspiration to return China to world preeminence, which China held until expanding
European empires overwhelmed it in the 19th century and a long internal crisis ensued. 44 In calling
to make China once again the most powerful state in the world, China’s leaders make clear that a
change of the socio-political system goes hand-in-hand with that goal. 45 President Xi in 2013 said
that China “must . . . build[] a socialism that is superior to capitalism, and lay[] the foundation for
a future where we will win the initiative and have the dominant position.” 46 In his speech in 2017
to the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, President Xi predicted that “the
Marxism of 21st century China will, without a doubt, emanate more mighty, more compelling
power of truth.” 47

39. Jim Matis, Dep’t of Def., Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United
States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge 2 (2018).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Dr. Christopher Ashley Ford, Assistant Secretary Bureau of International Security and
Nonproliferation, Testimony to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
(June 20, 2019) in Technology and Power in China’s Geopolitical Ambitions, U.S. Dep’t of State
(June 20, 2019), https://2017-2021.state.gov/technology-and-power-in-chinas-geopoliticalambitions/index.html [https://perma.cc/3R9Z-PWJJ].
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Xi Jinping, General Secretary, Uphold and Develop Socialism with Chinese Characteristics
(Jan. 5th, 2013), translated in Tanner Greer, Xi Jinping in Translation: China’s Guiding
Ideology, Palladium (May 31, 2019), https://palladiummag.com/2019/05/31/xi-jinping-intranslation-chinas-guiding-ideology/ [https://perma.cc/8R8C-NYSX].
47. Xi Jinping, Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All
Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New
Era, Delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Oct. 18, 2017),
in Full text of Xi Jinping's report at 19th CPC National Congress, Xinhua (Nov. 3, 2017, 5:17
PM),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Cong
ress.pdf).
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Lest President Xi be misunderstood to mean that China will prevail on the strength of
compelling argument, China’s conduct evinces a strategy of action. 48 This includes China’s
strategic lending to low-income countries, 49 conducted without the democratic and human rights
standards applicable to World Bank loans; 50 its Belt-and-Road Initiative that shunts not only trade
but dispute settlement procedures into PRC channels; 51 its endeavor with Russia to reshape the
socio-legal systems of Eurasia along lines that eschew the individualism and freedoms associated
with the United States and other rule-of-law countries. 52 China’s macro-economic and security
policies have significantly affected international economic relations: 53 Free trade—which
countries have pursued since World War II through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and its development into the World Trade Organization (WTO) 54—relies on the premise

48 See Drew Thompson, The Rise of Xi Jinping and China’s New Era: Implications for the
United States and Taiwan, 56 Issues & Stud.: Soc. Sci. Q. on China, Taiwan, & E. Asian Aff.
204004, 2040004-3 (2020).
49 See Sophie Richardson, China’s Influence on the Global Human Rights System 3 (2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/FP_20200914_china_human_rights_richardson.pdf.
50. Jonathan Wheatley, China’s secret loan contracts reveal its hold over low-income nations,
Fin. Times (Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/7e98795f-159b-4455-903e6e21c345d4a9 [https://perma.cc/Z6VN-AXH4] (note that the World Bank supports human rights
as a part of its twin goals “to end extreme poverty and promote shared prosperity.” See Justice
and Development, World Bank, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/justicerights-and-public-safety [https://perma.cc/334D-XA7S].
51. Jiangyu Wang, Dispute Settlement in the Belt and Road Initiative: Progress, Issues, and
Future Research Agenda, 8 Chinese J. Compar. L. 4, 11 (2020); Wangwei Lin et al., Developing
a Dispute Resolution Mechanism for China’s “One Belt, One Road” Initiative, 4 Co. Law. 118,
118 (2019).
52. Cf. Press Release, People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, Joint statement
of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the development of a
comprehensive strategic partnership for collaboration in the new era (Jun. 6, 2019),
https://www.bilaterals.org/?joint-statement-of-the-people-s [https://perma.cc/9M8E-MW7K].
See also, Andrew Scobell et al., China’s Grand Strategy: Trends, Trajectories, and Long-Term
Competition 9 (2020) (leaders in China perceive that they are in a long-term geopolitical
competition with the United States), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2798.html
[https://perma.cc/9XEX-KLLZ].
53 See John J. Mearsheimer, Bound to Fail: The Raise and Fall of the Liberal International
Order, 43 Int’l Sec. 7, 46 (2019).
54 See, e.g., Craig VanGrasstek, The History and Future of the World Trade Organization
(2013), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/historywto_e.pdf.
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that economic relations are essentially firm-to-firm and, thus, governed by the free market. 55
China erodes the premise with far-reaching mercantilist and security policies, including its socalled military-civil fusion (MCF). 56 China, in pursuing its system-changing ambitions, also uses
blunt intimidation. 57 For example, PRC dam-building projects at home and abroad take control of
water flow from downstream neighbors—a leveraging tactic that countries widely understand to
be illegal. 58 China asserts claims that would exclude all other nations from the South China Sea,
a vast maritime area where international law and the practice of centuries’ standing denies any one
country exclusive rights. 59
55 See Winston H. Griffith, Neoliberal Economics and Caribbean Economies, 44 J. Econ. Issues
505, 505 (2010).
56. See U.S. Dep’t State, Military-Civil Fusion and the People’s Republic of China (2020),
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/What-is-MCF-One-Pager.pdf. See also,
William Barr, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t Just., Remarks on China Policy at the Gerald R. Ford
Presidential Museum (July 17, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/transcript-attorneygeneral-barr-s-remarks-china-policy-gerald-r-ford-presidential-museum [https://perma.cc/M229NUF7].
57 See Sec’y State, The Elements of the China Challenge 17-18 (2020),
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/20-02832-Elements-of-China-Challenge508.pdf.
58. See Patrick Mendis & Antonina Luszczykiewicz, The Geopolitics of Water and the New
Indo-Pacific Strategy, Harv. Int’l Rev. (Mar. 22, 2021), https://hir.harvard.edu/geopolitics-oftaiwan-and-tibet/ [https://perma.cc/V7KB-UK27]. See, e.g., Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman,
Geopolitics of Sino-Indian Transboundary Water Management in the Yarlung Tsangpo and the
Brahmaputra, 45 Mondes en Développement 63, 64 (2017).
59. The exorbitance of China’s claims is not in China’s claims to certain existing natural land
features (rocks). It is in China’s assertion that it holds some form of sovereign right over
maritime areas that neither law nor modern practice recognize as susceptible to appropriation or
unilateral jurisdiction. China is deliberately imprecise—and changeable—when alluding to that
sovereign right, but it has used physical intimidation against other countries’ fishing vessels and
oil and gas platforms in the area concerned. The main symbolic expression of China’s exorbitant
South China Sea claim is the so-called nine-dashed line, communicated in 2009. U.N. SecretaryGeneral, Letter dated May 7, 2009 from the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of
China addressed to H.E. Mr. Ban Ki-Moon, Sec’y Gen., CML/17/2009,
https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm
_e.pdf; U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated May 7, 2009 from the Permanent Mission of the
People’s Republic of China addressed to H.E. Mr. Ban Ki-Moon, Sec’y Gen., CML/18/2009,
https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/chn_2009re_vnm.pdf. See
also, In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, ¶¶
169-278 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016). Regarding the unlawfulness of China’s claims to “some form of
exclusive jurisdiction” in the South China Sea, see United States Department of State, People’s
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Geopolitics, though out of fashion in most humanities and social sciences faculties, 60 has shaped
the conduct of countries for centuries and continues to do so today. 61 Strategists in the US have
recognized the centrality of geopolitical thought to China’s leaders, 62 as those leaders seek to
change the international system not merely to give China new advantages but to place China in a
position of unrivaled power. 63 It is in this sense that China is a revisionist state, not one satisfied
with the status quo. 64
The metaphor of China seeking to replace the “operating system” of world affairs is particularly
salient when considering China’s use of sanctions against the legal profession. 65 If any institution
in a rule-of-law society belongs to its “operating system,” then it is the law. 66 The courts, party
counsel, and adjudication are not mere accessories in the United States and like-minded
countries. 67 They are core elements of how we, in these countries, understand who we are. But
they are not just about values or identity: the rules, procedures, and institutions of our legal system
are crucial tools, and we rely on them in all aspects of society, including in the operation of
Republic of China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea 150 Limits in the Seas 1, 14-15, 1719, 21, 24-25, 30 (2022).
60. But see Univ. Cambridge Centre for Geopolitics, Annual Report 2020 4 (2020),
https://www.cfg.polis.cam.ac.uk/system/files/documents/centre_for_geopolitics_annual_report_2
020.pdf.
61. See Graham Allison, The New Spheres of Influence: Sharing the Globe with Other Great
Powers, 99 Foreign Aff. 30, 30-31, 36, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/unitedstates/2020-02-10/new-spheres-influence.
62. See Robert D. Blackwill & Ashley J. Tellis, Council on Foreign Relations, Revising U.S.
Grand Strategy Toward China 36-37 (2015),
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf.
63 See Hal Brands & Jake Sullivan, China Has Two Paths to Global Domination, Foreign Pol’y
(May 22, 2021), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/22/china-superpower-two-paths-globaldomination-cold-war/# [https://perma.cc/WH42-AE4L].
64. See Dep’t of Def., Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of
America, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-StrategySummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/BT92-UQG6]; see also Christopher Ford, Ideological “Grievance
States” and Nonproliferation: China, Russia, and Iran,New Paradigms F. (Nov. 12, 2019),
https://www.newparadigmsforum.com/p2442 [https://perma.cc/UG7D-N32J ].
65. See Chenglin Liu, Risks Faced by Foreign Lawyers in China, 35 Ariz. J. of Int’l & Compar.
L. 131, 135 (2018); William Nee, China’s 709 Crackdown Is Still Going On, The Diplomat (July
9, 2021), https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/chinas-709-crackdown-is-still-going-on/
[https://perma.cc/3CSA-HRZY].
66. See Raul Cordenillo & Kristen Sample, Introduction, in Rule of Law and Constitution
Building: The Role of Regional Organizations 1-2 (Cordenillo & Sample eds.2014),.
67. See Rachel Klienfield Belton, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law: Implications for
Practitioners 8-9, 11 (2005).
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government and public administration. 68 China’s sanctions in March 2021, while targeting a small
group of lawyers in one country, should be seen as part of a larger strategy to influence legal
systems. 69 Legal systems—as China’s strategic vision seems to hold them—are tolerable if they
acquiesce in China’s conduct, but if they challenge China then China seeks to bring them to heel. 70
China has discovered sanctions as a tool to pursue that goal. 71
Problematically, the professional practices and habits of mind that make lawyers and judges so
important in a rule-of-law society 72 do not necessarily attune them to the kind of risk involved
here. 73 Law is about the particulars—particular parties, particular disputes, and particular rules. 74
It is not the lawyer’s job to strategize about geopolitics. 75 Accordingly, lawyers and judges are
not likely to respond to the threat that intrusive and coercive measures such as the Essex Courts
sanctions present, except by modifying their behavior case by case. 76 That is what China likely
anticipated. 77 It is precisely what lawyers did. 78 Following the sanctions—in some instances
68 Fritz Morstein Marx, The Lawyer’s role in Public Administration, 55 Yale L. J. 498, 498
(1946).
69. See Emily Feng, China’s New Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law Sends a Chill Through the
Business Community, Nat’l Pub. Radio (June 11, 2021),
https://www.npr.org/2021/06/11/1005467033/chinas-new-anti-foreign-sanctions-law-sends-achill-through-the-business-communi [https://perma.cc/T2KS-NTYC]; Austin Ramzy, China
Moves to Punish Lawyers Hired to Help Hong Kong Activists, N.Y. Times (Jan 4, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/04/world/asia/china-hong-kong-lu-siwei-ren-quanniu.html
[https://perma.cc/8ABD-YKST].
70. See Int’l Serv. for Hum. Rts., Human Rights Defenders and Lawyers in China: A Mid-Term
Assessment of Implementation During the UPR Second Cycle 6-8 (2015),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/UPR/NGOsMidTermReports/ISHR_midterm_Chi
na.pdf [https://perma.cc/EKN4-DDJJ].
71. See Emily Feng, ‘Where No One Dares Speak Up’ China Disbars Lawyers on Sensitive
Cases, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Feb. 18, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/02/18/963217332/where-noone-dares-speak-up-china-disbars-lawyers-on-sensitive-cases [https://perma.cc/YBD4-XEMX].
72. See Robert W. Gordon, The Role of Lawyers in Producing the Rule of Law: Some Critical
Reflections, 11 Theoretical Inq. L. 441, 457-58 (2010).
73. See Ben. W. Heineman, Jr. et al., Lawyers as Professionals and as Citizens: Key Roles and
Responsibilities in the 21st Century 6, 10, 22, 51 (2015).
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76. See Riordan et al., supra note 20.
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almost immediately—lawyers modified their behavior. 79 They distanced themselves from the
colleagues and the organization that China had targeted. 80 In so doing, they amplified the warning
that China had intended. 81 The warning is this: if you express views to which China objects, or
represent clients of whom China disapproves, then you should expect China to impose costs. 82
The result that China hopes thereby to achieve is to silence any who might object to China’s
conduct 83—and, in time, to reconfigure the “operating system” of the rule-of-law world. 84 That
result is not the business of the legal profession alone. 85
III. Tit-for-Tat? Or Meaningful Impact?
Naturally, when a competing country adopts a measure that one judges to prejudice one’s own
country’s interests, the first reaction is to address the competing country with a reciprocal measure,
similar in target and amplitude. 86 Tit-for-tat is typical in diplomatic incidents 87: one country expels

https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/chinas-planned-anti-sanctions-law-hong-kongunsettles-financial-sector-2021-08-19/ [https://perma.cc/WB6S-Y5LC].
79. See China Undermining Human Rights By Locking Up Rights Lawyers, UN Independent
Expert Says, U.N. News (Dec. 16, 2020), https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/12/1080242
[https://perma.cc/S555-P925].
80. See Meganne Tillay, Essex Court Loses Another QC After Chinese Sanctions, Law.com Int’l
(Aug. 18, 2021), https://www.law.com/international-edition/2021/08/18/essex-court-losesanother-qc-after-chinese-sanctions/ [https://perma.cc/U2PD-FRTD].
81. See Lisa Shuchman, Global Talent Wars and Geopolitics Upend the Legal Industry,
Law.com Int’l (Oct. 18, 2021), https://www.law.com/international-edition/2021/10/18/globaltalent-wars-and-geopolitics-upend-the-legal-industry/ [https://perma.cc/H7LN-HVCD].
82. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab, China 2020 Human Rights
Report 1-2, 11-12 (2020).
83. See Malcolm Jorgenson, China Is Overturning the Rules-Based Order from Within, The
Interpreter (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-overturningrules-based-order-within [https://perma.cc/BZ2M-WLMG].
84. See Jeffrey Cimmino, A Strategic Framework for Countering China’s Human-Rights
Violations in Xinjiang 5-7 (2021).
85. See Barbara Dluhosch & Daniel Horgos, (When) Does Tit-for-Tat Diplomacy in Trade
Policy Pay Off? 2 (FIW- Rsch. Ctr. Int’l Econ. Working Paper, Paper No. 84, 2012),
86. See Marianne Schneider-Petsigner et al., US-China Strategic: The Quest for Global
Technological Leadership 3-6 (2019).
87. See Olga Krasnyak, Tit for Tat: Diplomatic Expulsions and Closures, Univ. of S. Cal. Ctr.
for Pub. Diplomacy (Sept. 13, 2017), https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/tit-tat-diplomaticexpulsions-and-closures [https://perma.cc/JH79-XXQZ].

112

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

[VOL. 55, NO. 1

an embassy officer, then the other country expels an officer of similar rank. 88 In diplomatic
incidents, states take measures at government-to-government level. 89 Each measure targets the
government itself. 90 We should ask, however, whether it is adequate here to focus on China itself,
in response to the particular challenge that China’s anti-rule-of-law sanctions have raised. 91
Several high-profile individuals and institutions, as well as the U.S. and UK governments, have
ventured to address the Essex Court sanctions. 92 It is not clear that the measures taken so far will
counteract the sanctions’ intended effect. 93
The UK Prime Minister and U.S. President “expressed their concern about retaliatory [action]”
taken by China.” 94 The UK Foreign Minister addressed the matter, stating that “[i]t speaks volumes
that, while the UK joins the international community in sanctioning those responsible for human
rights abuses, the Chinese government sanctions its critics.” 95
The regulatory bodies for barristers in the British Isles—the Bar Council of England and Wales,
the Faculty of Advocates of Scotland, and the Bar Council of Northern Ireland, and the Bar of
Ireland—adopted a joint statement about the sanctions. 96 The joint statement, inter alia, called on
88. See Andrew Osborn & Tom Balmforth, Russia Retaliating Against Washington, Asks 10
U.S. Diplomats to Leave, Reuters (Apr. 12, 2021),
https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/kremlin-says-putin-decide-counter-sanctions-againstwashington-2021-04-16/ [https://perma.cc/3LFN-Q64A].
89. See id.
90. See Heather A. Conley & Roksana Gabidllina, The Costs of Weaponizing Russian and
Western Diplomatic Expulsions, Ct. for Strategic and Int’l Stud. (June 10, 2021),
https://www.csis.org/analysis/costs-weaponizing-russian-and-western-diplomatic-expulsions
[https://perma.cc/2EKX-LV8T].
91. See, Securing a Democratic World: The Case for a Democratic Values-Based U.S. Foreign
Policy (2018),
92. See Caroline Simson, Response to China’s Sanctions on UK Lawyers Seen as Weak, Law
360 (May 3, 2021), https://www.law360.com/articles/1379363/response-to-china-s-sanctions-onuk-lawyers-seen-as-weak [https://perma.cc/EH4C-RVZ2].
93. See id.
94. See Johnson and Biden share UK-US concern about Chinese response to sanctions –
spokesman, Reuters (Mar. 26, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-usa-johnsonbiden/johnson-and-biden-share-uk-us-concern-about-chinese-response-to-sanctions-spokesmanidUSKBN2BI2Y9 [https://perma.cc/3BGA-62FG].
95. Press Release, Dominic Raab, Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and
Development Affairs, China’s sanctions on UK citizens: Foreign Secretary’s statement,
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-perpetrators-of-gross-human-rightsviolations-in-xinjiang-alongside-eu-canada-and-us [https://perma.cc/5UMS-4SYT].
96. See Statement of the Four Bars on PRC Government Sanctions Against Barristers,
https://www.barcouncil.org.uk/resource/statement-of-the-four-bars-on-prc-governmentsanctions-against-barristers.html [https://perma.cc/A23U-UYVE].
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“national and international Bar associations to condemn the imposition of these sanctions as an
unjustifiable interference with the professional role of lawyers and an attack upon the rule of law
internationally.” 97 The joint statement acknowledged that the sanctions “are . . . a threat to the
global legal community,” and called on the People’s Republic of China (PRC), to “review these
sanctions.” 98
Senior executives of the International Bar Association (IBA) also made statements. Mark Ellis,
the IBA Executive Director, said that “[w]e respect and applaud those who are holding to account
anyone who may be violating the fundamental human rights of others.” 99 The Executive Director’s
remarks are welcome insofar as they reflect his organization’s cognizance of the possibility that
somebody might be responsible for human rights violations, even if the remarks were pointedly
non-specific with respect to who the violator might be. 100 Sternford Moyo, the IBA President, said
that “[i]t is ironic that the very voices the Chinese authorities sought to silence have, inadvertently,
been amplified because of imposition of sanctions.” 101 These remarks, too, are welcome,
expressing solidarity as they do with the lawyers whom China sanctioned.
It is far from clear, however, that amplifying the message was inadvertent. It would appear to
be of a piece with the method that China here employs. China’s method in sanctioning the Essex
Court lawyers is to induce changes of behavior in the legal profession as a whole; China’s purpose
is therefore served when governments and legal institutions merely supply reminders that China is
ready to impose costs on lawyers who refrain from adopting those changes. 102 In the responses to
date, it is easy to discern reminders—an inadvertent amplification—of the very threat that China
aims to communicate. But it is hard to discern any reason for the profession to refrain from doing
precisely what Chin’s threats are designed to get them to doa.
To have a meaningful impact, a response to China’s sanctions must give the profession a reason
to refrain from changing their behavior to comport with China’s preferences: the response must
include some practical incentive for lawyers. The EU, with the sanctions blocking statute that it
adopted in 1996 to forbid compliance by EU parties with certain foreign sanctions, illustrates one
way such a response might be shaped. The EU sanctions blocking statute to date has addressed
only US sanctions. The statute is drafted, however, so that it could address other countries’
sanctions as well. That statute may be read, moreover, not just for its specific legal machinery,
but for the outline of a general approach to counter-sanctions strategy.

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Press Release, Int’l Bar Ass’n, China: IBA Salutes Advocates Standing Up for the Rule of
Law (Mar. 29, 2021), https://www.ibanet.org/article/1E5D5333-F4C7-4CA7-9255C8D5F5CFB3D8 [https://perma.cc/5CGV-X8PT].
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See e.g. Council Regulation 2271/96, art. 1, 1996 O.J. (L 309) 2 (EC).
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To begin considering how a blocking statute might work, let us turn to the recent case in which
the EU’s blocking statute has been applied, Telekom Deutschland, before suggesting some other
steps that countries and the legal profession might take along the lines of that general approach.
IV. Telekom Deutschland and Making Counter-Sanctions Work
In Telekom Deutschland, the E.C.J. was called upon to interpret Council Regulation (EC) No.
2271/96 of November 22, 1996—a sanctions blocking statute that aims to “counteract[] the effects
of the extra-territorial application” of certain U.S. sanctions laws. 103 The circumstances were that
Telekom Deutschland, seemingly in response to the extraterritorial application of U.S. sanctions
addressing Iran, terminated certain service contracts with Bank Melli Iran, an Iranian state-owned
bank. 104 The bank sued to restore the service contracts. 105
The Advocate General delivered his opinion in Telekom Deutschland (Opinion) on May 12,
2021 and the Court (Grand Chamber) delivered its judgment on December 21, 2021. In the
essential points of the case, the judgment accorded with the Judge Advocate’s opinion, though
with some important refinements that are salient to how a legislator might fashion a sanctionsblocking law to address China’s anti-rule-of-law sanctions.
Under the judgment of December 21, 2021, Bank Melli Iran’s case is now referred back to the
national court which had stayed proceedings to request the CJEU’s judgment. 106 In accordance
with the judgment the national court shall apply the EU’s sanctions blocking statute, even though
the U.S. sanctions law, to date, was not accompanied by any U.S. judgment or other action directly
addressing Deutsche Telekom. 107 According to the CJEU, “the mere threat of the legal
consequences that could be incurred” by breaching the U.S. sanctions law are “capable of
producing [the] effects” that the EU sanctions-blocking statute is intended to prevent. 108 An initial
point, then, is that a response to sanctions needs to address the dissuasive effects of sanctions, not
just specific legal burdens the sanctions have actually placed on a sanctions target. This is an
important point when we consider China’s sanctions because, as noted, China intends its sanctions
not merely to affect particular targets; it intends them to dissuade important actors throughout
society from carrying out their proper functions.

103. Id. at 2.
104. Telekom (Judgment), supra note 12, at ¶¶ 16-22; Telekom (Advocate General’s Opinion),
supra note 14.
105 Telekom (Judgment), supra note 12, ¶ 23; Telekom (Advocate General’s Opinion) supra
note 14.
106. Telekom (Judgment), ¶ 34.
107. Telekom (Judgment), ¶¶ 42-51.
108. Telekom (Judgment), supra note 12, at ¶ 49.
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The judgment of December 21, 2021 affirms that the blocking statute gives a private party such
as Bank Melli Iran standing to sue. 109 As the Advocate General had observed, it is not just for
public regulators to enforce the counter-sanctions law. 110
Two substantive points that the Advocate General had drawn attention to are particularly
relevant for present purposes. First, the Advocate General had concluded that a person who has
terminated a contractual obligation with a sanctioned party may be compelled to give reasons why
it did so. 111 So too may a person who has refrained from entering a contractual relationship with a
sanctioned party be called upon to give reasons why. 112 On our reading, the CJEU’s judgment
accords with those conclusions. 113
The second substantive point is that a person who has terminated a contractual relationship in
order to comply with the sanctions may be compelled by a court to re-enter the relationship. 114 The
Advocate General acknowledged that this injunction, which is akin to specific performance, is a
“blunt” remedy but concluded that the statutory language requires it. 115 Here, the CJEU added
some important nuance. The CJEU acknowledged that a national court remedy of annulment—by
which Deutsche Telekom’s termination of its contracts with Bank Melli Iran would cease to have
any legal effect and, thus, those contracts, in effect, would be reinstated—would “entail[...] a
limitation on the freedom to conduct a business” which is a fundamental right of companies and
individuals in the EU 116; and, moreover, that reinstating its contracts with the Iranian company,
because doing so would run afoul the US sanctions law, would expose Deutsche Telekom to the
potential loss of its US business—in other words, nearly half of Deutsche Telekom’s entire
business. 117 The CJEU identified two pathways to avoid such a catastrophic impact on the
defendant. One is contained in the EU sanctions-blocking statute itself. Under the second
paragraph of Article 5 of the EU Regulation, a party may seek authorization to comply with a
foreign sanction. The task of deciding whether to grant such an authorization belongs to the EU
109. Telekom (Judgment), supra note 12, at ¶¶ 59, 67-68.
110. Telekom (Advocate General’s Opinion), supra note 14,
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. The judgment interprets Art. 5 of the EU sanctions-blocking law, Regulation No. 2271/96,
not to require, in itself, that a party give reasons when terminating a contract with a person on the
US sanctions list. Telekom (Judgment), supra note 12, at ¶ 63. However, in a civil proceeding in
which the claimant alleges infringement of the Regulation, if the evidence “tends to indicate
prima facie” that the defendant has terminated the contract in order to comply with the US
sanctions that the Regulation intends to block, then the burden is on the defendant to prove that
sanctions compliance was not the reason for termination. Id., ¶ 67.
114. Telekom (Advocate General’s Opinion), supra note 14. For reasoning, see id.
115. Id., ¶ 136.
116. Telekom (Judgment), supra note 12, at ¶ 77.
117. Id., ¶ 16.
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Commission, to be assisted by a committee of the EU Parliament (the Committee on Extraterritorial Legislation). 118
The other pathway available to a defendant is to plead to the national court that non-compliance
with the foreign sanctions (which is to say, compliance with the EU sanctions-blocking
Regulation) will cause an injury to the defendant out of proportion to any benefit that state of
affairs will produce for the EU legal order. 119 The sanctions-blocking Regulation serves “to protect
the established legal order and the interests of the European Union in general,” but the
implementation of the Regulation must be in a manner that does not have disproportionate effect
on the defendant’s fundamental economic rights. 120
The two pathways for avoiding adverse economic consequences of ignoring foreign sanctions
seem to be intertwined, at least to a degree. In Deutsche Telekom’s case, it appears that the
company did not apply to the EU Commission to obtain an authorization to comply with US Iran
sanctions. 121 Though the matter will be in the hands of the national court, the CJEU suggests that
this omission will weaken any proportionality plea that Deutsche Telekom might make in the
national court proceedings. 122 It would appear that the CJEU is inviting—but does not require—
the national court to lay down an incentive on companies to channel future sanctions
compliance/non-compliance issues through the EU Commission procedure supplied by the second
paragraph of Article 5 of the sanctions-blocking Regulation. The Advocate General thus was
correct to say that the remedy for failing to respect the sanctions-blocking Regulation can be
“blunt,” but the CJEU has drawn attention to a regulatory channel (through the Commission with
assistance of the parliamentary committee) and a proportionality assessment (to be conducted by
the national court) that might soften the impact.
The posture of the legal profession in regard to China’s sanctions is not identical to that of
companies like Telekom Deutschland engaged in business relationships with sanctioned entities.
But the scope of the relevant provision of the EU blocking statute is broad:
“No person referred to . . . shall comply, whether directly or through a subsidiary or other
intermediary person, actively or by deliberate omission, with any requirement or prohibition,
including requests of foreign courts, based on or resulting, directly or indirectly, from the laws
specified in the Annex or from actions based thereon or resulting therefrom.” 123

118. Id., ¶ 84.
119. Id., ¶¶ 90-95.
120. Id., ¶ 90.
121. Id., ¶ 93.
122. Telekom (Judgment), supra note 12, at ¶ 93.
123. Council Regulation 2271/96, supra note 103, art. 5. The phrase “[n]o person referred to”
brings within Art. 5’s scope a number of categories of persons, including, among others, “any
natural person being a resident in the [EU],” and “any legal person incorporated within the
[EU].” Id. art. 11.
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The phrases “based on or resulting, directly or indirectly from” and “based thereon or resulting
therefrom” suggest the breadth of the provision’s scope. The provision does not appear to be
restricted to active steps that are in direct response to a barred foreign sanctions law (that is, one
of the “laws specified in the Annex”).
A blocking statute drafted to address the particular challenge raised by China’s sanctions could
both broaden and refine the focus. For example, a legislator might consider calling on professional
services firms to demonstrate that their reason for entering or refraining from selected relationships
is not to hew to China’s wishes. Under a blocking statute, a firm that avoids potential clients whom
China has targeted with sanctions might trigger possible liability exposure. Individual
practitioners might face discipline or liability for sanctions compliance or other defined behavior
that serves the sanctions’ purpose. So, too, could a sanctions-blocking statute supply pathways
such as those that the CJEU identified in the December 21, 2021 judgment, available to a party
that demonstrates that complying with the statute in the circumstances would impose on the party
a burden out of proportion to the public purpose that the legislator intends compliance to serve.
There may be a role here for professional bodies as well as legislatures. Considering how to
fashion a response to the Essex Court sanctions, an eminent English barrister, Lord Sandhurst QC,
suggested that the Bar Councils modify their codes of professional conduct. 124 The object would
be to dissuade lawyers from taking clients who might flee the sanctioned set: “Essex Court
Chambers cannot be left isolated. It would be intolerable if other chambers or law firms simply
took over work which is transferred away from Essex Court. Urgent thought must be given to
special codes of conduct to prevent that.” 125 The Bar Councils (at least as of January 2022) had
not modified their codes in any considerable way. 126
124. Neil Rose, Former Bar Chair’s Rallying Call: ‘We Are All Essex Court Now’, Legal
Futures (Apr. 6, 2021, 12:03 AM), https://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/former-bar-chairsrallying-call-we-are-all-essex-court-now.
125. Id.
126. Some lawyers well may object that such modification would take the codes of professional
conduct in altogether new and unfamiliar directions, but the existing codes, in fact, contain
provisions that would seem to impose obligations along somewhat similar lines. The present
writers are not members of the English bar, so we do not purport to give interpretations of
English bar rules. But the Bar Standards Board Handbook contains a number of exacting
provisions in relation to the duty of barristers to supply legal services. Bar Standards Board, Bar
Standards Board Handbook – Version 4.6 (Dec. 31, 2020). Turning to Rule C28, for example,
one reads that, if you are a barrister, “[y]ou must not withhold your services or permit your
services to be withheld: 1. on the ground that the nature of the case is objectionable to you or to
any section of the public; 2. on the ground that the conduct, opinions or beliefs of the prospective
client are unacceptable to you or to any section of the public. . .” Id. § C28. The interpretative
Guidance to Rule C28 says that “[t]his obligation applies whether or not the client is a member
of any protected group” for purposes of UK statute. Id. Famously, English barristers are subject
to the “cab rank rule”—which likens their professional duty to represent clients to the tradition
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Private parties might also have a role to play. As noted in Telekom Deutschland, the EU
blocking Regulation entails standing for certain private parties to bring suit, where they are ready
to make plausible allegations that a defendant’s conduct was for purposes of compliance with a
barred sanctions law. 127 The burden on a plaintiff in this regard is not very onerous. 128 If a
claimant “simply provide[s] prima facie evidence” that the defendant “may feel concerned by one
of the pieces of [sanctions] legislation mentioned in the annex [to the blocking statute]” and the
claimant has fulfilled the general commercial and legal conditions for becoming or remaining the
defendant’s customer, 129 then the burden arguably shifts to the defendant. The defendant must then
“establish that there was an objective reason, other than the fact that the [claimant] was subject to
primary sanctions” to explain why the defendant adopted the course of conduct it did (i.e.,
terminating a relationship or declining to start one); and the court must “verify the veracity of such
[reason].” 130 Readying their internal records for litigation along these lines no doubt would place
an unwelcome compliance burden on potential future defendants. According to the Advocate
General, the burden, however, is one that the EU legislator thought is justified by the policy
purpose served. 131
China, with its Essex Court sanctions, seeks to change how the legal system functions by
dissuading the legal profession at large from representing clients, interests, or viewpoints that
China opposes. To have a meaningful impact, the response that governments and the profession
adopt to the sanctions must counteract that dissuasive method. A response to the sanctions,
therefore, should be considered that would give the profession incentives that run the other way.

among London cab drivers that a driver is obliged to take the first passenger who requests a ride
at the head of a line of cabs. Id. § C29. The bar rules express the rule at Rules C29 and C30.
See id. §§ C29, C30. Subject to exceptions relating, inter alia, to fees and professional specialty
and availability, a barrister is obliged to accept instructions from a client, irrespective of the
identity of the client and the nature of the case to which the instructions relate. Id. § C29. No
doubt, the lawyers who moved chambers after China’s sanctions in March 2021 have taken care
of these rules. But one might ask whether re-organizing one’s practice so as not to offend China
is the best possible way to fulfill the standards that the Bar places on the profession.
127, Telekom (Judgment), supra note 12, ¶¶ 59, 67-68.
128. See id.
129. Telekom (Advocate General’s Opinion), supra note 14.
130. Id., ¶ 98 (emphasis in original); see also id., ¶ 111.
131. Id. ¶ 97. The CJEU in its judgment of Dec. 21, 2021, on our reading, does not take any clear
exception with the Advocate General on this point about compliance burden. Moreover, where
the judgment identifies the possibility of the burden of proof shifting to the defendant (Telekom
(Judgment), supra note 12, ¶ 68), it follows that a prudent business with a potential exposure to
US sanctions liability will take steps in its own decision-making and record-keeping to prepare
itself for the situation in which a plaintiff might demand proof of the reason for its acts or
omissions.
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Sovereign-to-sovereign measures may also have a role to play as rule-of-law societies address
China’s sanctions, but measures that function only at sovereign level do not quite hit the mark. In
pursuit of its larger goals, China’s method is to induce change in private behavior, and so a
sanctions counter-strategy needs to focus at the private level too.
The European Parliament, on May 20, 2021, gave an example of what a sovereign-level response
might look like. 132 China had sanctioned certain EU parliamentarians. 133 The Parliament voted
to freeze efforts to ratify the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, an EU-China trade
treaty. 134 According to the European Parliament’s resolution on the matter, it “considers it crucial
for the EU and all its institutions to stand united against this attack against European democracy
and in defending our common values.” 135 The resolution “demands that China lift the sanctions
before Parliament can deal” with the trade agreement. 136 It also said that “intimidation attempts
[by China] are futile.” 137 The resolution is encouraging because it suggests that at least one
important legislator recognizes the gravity of the situation. 138 Assuming that the resolution results
in a serious delay in the EU-China trade negotiations, it is not a mere token. 139
But the Parliament resolution is still very much in the traditional mold; it is a sovereign-tosovereign measure, addressed to a government to get that government to do, or refrain from doing,
something. 140 To this extent, suspending trade negotiations, while helpful, does not respond
everywhere that a response must be felt. China’s sanctions have already bypassed the classic
channel of intergovernmental relations. 141 China does not intend the sanctions to change the
conduct of this or public authority regarding one or another specific issue. 142 China’s target is the
behavior and habits of mind of private institutions and individuals, who form a critical piece of the
132. See generally Resolution on Chinese Countersanctions on EU Entities and MEPs and MPS,
Eur. Parl. Doc. P9_TA(2021)0255 (2021).
133. Id. ¶ D.
134. Jorge Liboreiro, MEPs Vote to Freeze Controversial EU-China Investment Deal, Euronews
(June 24, 2021), https://www.euronews.com/2021/05/20/european-parliament-votes-to-freezecontroversial-eu-china-investment-deal [https://perma.cc/K6RG-XAN4].
135. Resolution on Chinese Countersanctions on EU Entities and MEPs and MPs, supra note
120, ¶ 9.
136. Id. ¶ 10.
137. Id. ¶ 3.
138 See id. ¶ H.
139 See id. ¶ 6.
140. Id.
141. See Riordan et al., UK Lawyers Feel Ripples of Chinese Sanctions on Essex Court
Chambers, Financial Times (April 4, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/e6ab6819-6040-4b7fb579-3a51658f7a4b [ https://perma.cc/7XQP-LL6W].
142. See id.; See also Christopher Ford, Ideological “Grievance States” and Nonproliferation:
China, Russia, and Iran, New Paradigms Forum (Nov. 12, 2019),
https://www.newparadigmsforum.com/p2442 [https://perma.cc/C6JU-PC3W].
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operating system of a rule-of-law society. 143 The Essex Court sanctions are a tool to induce
systemic change. 144 To counteract them, rule-of-law societies need to shape a response that
reaches the same audience and influences that audience to continue to play its proper role within
the system to which it belongs.
V. The Equivalency Trap
Some might say that China’s sanctions are, in effect, equivalent to the sanctions that the US has
employed for many years; that China’s sanctions are no more troubling than those sanctions; and,
thus, it lies ill in the mouth of policy makers in the United States, or its allies, to criticize China.
In at least two respects, however, China’s sanctions are very much unlike sanctions employed by
the United States.
First, the ongoing US-EU contest over sanctions and their secondary effects does not, or at least
should not, concern policy goals. 145 It concerns, instead, what tools are appropriate for a country
to use in regard to an area of policy where a great deal of common ground exists. 146 Nuclear
nonproliferation and counterterrorism are not at odds with rule-of-law; to the contrary, these are
policies supported, at least in word, by practically all countries. 147 No such common ground exists
between China and the democratic countries in which China is targeting its sanctions. The
difference with China is over both the propriety of PRC sanctions that have effects outside China
and the policies and socio-political change that China hopes the sanctions will promote.
Second, the conduct from which China’s sanctions aim to dissuade individuals and institutions
is of systemic importance to the societies in which those sanctions have their intended dissuasive
effects: China’s sanctions threaten freedom of expression, freedom of association, and the
functioning of the legal profession in service to the rule of law. 148 While the EU judges it to be an
infringement of its rights when US sanctions deter a German telecommunications company from
providing phone service to an Iranian bank, we think a more serious concern is a sanction that
coerces the Bar into resiling from its duty to represent parties in litigation, to supply candid legal
advice, and to take principled stands in defense of human rights. 149 The Essex Court sanctions

143. Essex Court Chambers Statement Sanctions Imposed by Chinese Government, Essex Courts
Chambers (Mar. 26, 2021), https://essexcourt.com/essex-court-chambers-statement-on-sanctionsimposed-by-chinese-government/ [https://perma.cc/L97E-H2GQ].
144. See Riordan et al., supra note 141.
145. Telekom (Advocate General’s Opinion), supra note 14.
146. Id.
147. See id. ¶ 2; See also Christopher Ford, supra note 130.
148. See Andrew Scobell Et. Al., China’s Grand Strategy: Trends, Trajectories, and Long-Term
Competition, 9 (Rand Corp., 2020)..
149. See Telekom (Advocate General’s Opinion) supra note 14; See also Riordan et al., supra
note 141.
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aim to cast a pall over the legal profession, not merely to stop certain commercial actors from
engaging in specific transactions. 150
We think that to suggest equivalency between the US and PRC sanctions is to fall into a trap.
Human beings tend to habituate to new realities. If PRC sanctions, such as those against Essex
Court, come to be accepted as a new reality, then, no doubt, English barristers will habituate
themselves to it. 151 We submit that quitting our professional affiliations and self-censoring in
response to threats from a one-party dictatorship that seeks a free hand to suppress its ethnic
minorities and impose its “operating system” on the world at large is not a good habit. On the
contrary: it is behavior that a rule-of-law society should act to prevent. Declaring PRC sanctions
to be equivalent to western sanctions is unconvincing on the merits, and, we fear, it invites
habituating to PRC sanctions.
The wider legal setting behind the EU blocking statute is relevant here. The recitals to the EU
blocking statute declare that the extraterritorial application of “such laws, regulations and other
legislative instruments” as the US instruments targeted by the statute “violate international law.” 152
The Advocate General observed that academics and parliamentarians in some EU Member States
have said that US sanctions, when the sanctions have extraterritorial effects, are “not easily
reconciled with general principles of public international law,” 153 a view that the CJEU, quoting
the recitals of the sanctions-blocking Regulation, reiterated. 154 If US sanctions are not, then
China’s sanctions, serving to insulate China from scrutiny for evidently gross violations of human
rights, must be very difficult to reconcile with those principles indeed. True, the objections that
the Advocate General mentioned are objections about extraterritoriality, irrespective of the policies
that the sanctioning government pursues. 155 But if “general principles of public international law”
are brought into the picture, then it is unclear to us why those principles should be limited to
scrutinizing the sanction’s methods: surely, the sanction’s purpose also should enter into how ruleof-law countries respond. 156
VI. Summing Up: The Geopolitical Challenge and Making Counter-Sanctions Strategy

150. Neil Rose, Chambers Hit by China Sanctions Battens Down the Hatches, Legal Futures
(Mar. 30, 2021), https://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/chambers-hit-by-china-sanctionsbattens-down-the-hatches [https://perma.cc/FE5H-YVVT].
151 Riordan, et al., supra note 141.
152. Council Regulation 2271/96, supra note 103 at 1.
153. Telekom (Advocate General’s Opinion), supra note 14.
154. Telekom (Judgment), supra note 12, at ¶ 3; See also id.
155 See Telekom (Advocate General’s Opinion), supra note 14.
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Work
The democratic-liberal world has faced geopolitical challenges before, but the challengers in the
past, though using a wide range of tactics, seldom used sanctions. 157 Sanctions that exclude an
individual or a firm from a market are useless if nobody wants in that market. The USSR, the
democratic-liberal world’s chief competitor from 1945 to 1989, was not a market that very many
individuals or firms in the free world were eager to enter. 158 The USSR, therefore, did not attain
strategic objectives by using sanctions against individuals or firms in the free world. 159 By
contrast, many around the world are eager to participate in China’s market. 160 A PRC sanctions
law that excludes a professional or commercial actor from China’s market, therefore, has the
potential to be an effective tool in China’s international relations. 161 China indeed now has begun
to use sanctions.
The initial indications are that China has aimed its sanctions smartly. The recent experience
with China’s Essex Court sanctions suggests that the legal profession will respond quickly to a
sanctions threat. 162 The Essex Court sanctions were aimed at a small number of lawyers but carried
an unmistakable message to the legal profession at large: cross China, and face consequences. 163
The United States, United Kingdom, and like-minded countries should be concerned if China
targets any industry with sanctions, but China’s targeting of the legal profession should occasion
particular concern. 164 The legal services industry is not just another industry. In a society based
on rule of law, it is vital to every aspect of society. 165 To change the operating code of the legal
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profession the way that China seeks would be to change society in fundamental ways. 166 It is
China’s concept of “legal warfare,” which other writers have recently addressed, 167 directed against
law itself.
The change that China seeks by targeting lawyers with sanctions is in service to geopolitical
objectives that China’s leaders openly articulate. 168 Nation-states functioning on the basis of
democratic-liberal principles are at odds with the “harmonious society” that China says will come
to pass when China returns to its natural place as the central polity and political system of the
world. 169 Accordingly, those principles—the operating system of rule-of-law societies—must give
way to China’s conception of governance if China is to achieve its aspiration in the stated way. 170
The democratic-liberal countries, when facing geopolitical revisionist states in the past, faced
them essentially at the intergovernmental level. 171 Interpenetration of societies and economies
was minimal, and so, geopolitical strategy was directed at influencing domestic constituencies only
to a degree. It is the systematic, large-scale targeting of key constituencies in democratic-liberal
societies that identifies China’s sanctions as a new concern. 172
In its strategy today, China might well say that its sanctions intrude upon democratic-liberal
countries nowhere near as much as Europe’s measures of socio-political control did in China in
the age of Europe’s rise. 173 There may be echoes here, if distant, of China’s experience in the 19th
and early 20th centuries with the so-called capitulations—treaty arrangements under which
China’s courts and legal profession were subordinated to European jurisdiction, so that disputes
166 See Munoz Mosquera & Sascha Dov-Dominik (Dov) Bachmann, How China Uses Strategic
Preconditioning in the Age of Great Power Competition, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs (last
visited May 18, 2021), http://www.fletcherforum.org/home/2020/5/13/how-china-uses-strategicpreconditioning-in-the-age-of-great-power-competition [https://perma.cc/R2LD-H6YK]; See
also Christopher Ford, supra note 130.
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168 See Orazio Coco, Contemporary China and the Harmonious World Order in the Age of
Globalization, The Chinese J. of Corp. Governance, 1 (2020).
169. For a not unsympathetic account of China’s understanding of “harmony” in geopolitics, but
nevertheless expressing the essentials, see Orazio Coco, Contemporary China and the
“Harmonious” World Order in the Age of Globalization, 6(1) Chinese J. of Global Governance
1-19 (2020).
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after the Treaty of Montreux, 26 Transactions of the Grotius Soc’y 83, 83 (1940) (discussing the
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involving Europeans (and select Chinese collaborators) were no longer subject to the laws and
procedures of China but, instead, removed to “mixed courts” set up by the European countries in
key Chinese cities. 174 Capitulations were indeed an instrument of European domination in China
and around the world. 175 They were a significant, and justified, object of grievance. 176
But moral equivalence is a trap. Pleas that turnabout is fair play, while perhaps aesthetically
pleasing for the symmetry they invite between past and future, do nothing to come to grips with
the problem we face today. It is neither in the interest of democratic-liberal countries nor an
obligation on our part to accept the demands of a single-party state that we change to accommodate
that state’s plans for reordering world affairs. The substantive merits of the case certainly do not
recommend that we change our socio-political system to imitate China’s. 177 The continuing
practice of China of sending its students, engineers, and scientists to universities and research
institutions in the democratic-liberal countries, and China’s almost frantic intellectual property
theft, 178 are not redolent of self-confidence or success. It is hardly time to abandon the principles
that have served democratic-liberal societies so well.
The Telekom Deutschland case suggests, at least in a general way, how democratic-liberal
societies might defend our principles. 179 China’s sanctions target private actors with material
inducements and deterrents, and they set an example that other private actors, as things stand today,
find difficult to ignore. 180 A counter-sanctions strategy, therefore, will work best if it addresses
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private actors and not just China. 181 With inducements and deterrents to the legal profession that
present a counterpoise to China’s spoken and unspoken threats, a counter-sanctions strategy merits
serious consideration by professional leaders, policy makers, and legislators in the United States,
the United Kingdom, and beyond.
When concluding that the EU’s blocking-statute—a particular counter-sanctions strategy—
creates a private cause of action, the Advocate General of the CJEU in Telekom Deutschland said
that the legislature drafted the statute “in the most uncompromising and stark terms.” 182 He
characterized the EU blocking statute as “a very blunt instrument, designed as it is to sterilise the
intrusive extraterritorial effects of . . . sanctions within the Union.” 183 The Advocate General
noted, however, that “blunt” though the blocking statute may be, the EU anti-sanctions law targets
one country’s sanctions only. 184 Perhaps the Advocate General was inviting the EU legislator to
think more broadly about whom it addresses its blocking legislation to. 185 If so, then the invitation
is timely, even as the December 21, 2021 judgment of the CJEU offers some pathways to temper
the blocking statute’s potentially burdensome effects. 186
Whether intended as an invitation or not, Telekom Deutschland teaches a lesson: if we, as a
society, are serious about counteracting the effect of China’s sanctions, then we have tools for the
task. The tools include compensatory or even injunctive regimes to protect private actors from the
costs of sanctions; and deterrent measures to add costs to steps a private actor might take to stay
in the good books of the sanctioning state. A major commercial country that threatens private
actors in other countries will only escalate its threats, if those private actors give in. 187 But given
no inducement—affirmative or negative—to show resolve, a law firm, a barrister, or, for that
matter, a publicly traded corporation, almost certainly will not resist. 188 Where market share is at
stake, and only the sanctioning country offers inducements, the private actor is most likely to yield
to that country’s wishes. 189
None of this is to call for a new regulatory burden before carefully measuring the benefits and
costs. The EU sanctions-blocking legislation may impose costs on EU businesses; the CJEU
judgment of December 21, 2021 recognizes this. 190 It remains to be seen how businesses address
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the compliance challenges that that legislation seems to present. 191 Compliance will include clear
internal records maintenance that shows the reasons for terminating a relationship with a customer
or co-venturer (or for not starting one). 192 Individuals and organizations, including the full range
of professional organizations, should think carefully about their compliance strategies as the
jurisprudence evolves and as legislators consider next steps as well. 193 Aligning one’s conduct
with statutory counter-sanctions rules answers legal and prudential concerns. With well-cast rules
that address the geopolitical concerns that China’s new sanctions present, corporate compliance
also may be put in service to larger social ends.
It would be a mistake if rule-of-law countries restricted themselves to symbolic gestures when
responding to China’s sanctions. When the Advocate General studied the EU blocking statute, he
was troubled by the consequences for businesses that its strong wording might entail. 194 But he
concluded that, “[i]n these circumstances, the threat of ‘dissuasive’ sanctions”” not supported by
concrete steps “would likely be a hollow one and the Union and its Member States would be
reduced, like Shakespeare’s King Lear, to protesting that they would ‘do such things . . . I know
not [what], but they shall be the terrors of the earth’.” 195 The title character of the play was enraged
over the sanctions his daughters had imposed on him, but, a spent force, he had no effective way
to respond. 196 Rule of law is not a spent force. The countries that embrace it have the ingenuity
and means to address the challenge that China’s sanctions present.
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